0003. Connection kinds and the tenant boundary¶
Status: accepted; amended by ADR 0010 (address and audiences move to OpenBaoServer). Date: 2026-11-13.
Context¶
Connection and authentication details repeated in every resource are verbose and drift apart. A shared connection that logs in with the operator's own token makes the boundary between tenants only Kubernetes RBAC on who may create a connection: every tenant acts with the operator's OpenBao policy.
The OpenBao policy behind a token is the only real limit on what a request can do.
Decision¶
OpenBaoConnectionis namespaced and usable only from its own namespace.ClusterOpenBaoConnectionis cluster-scoped, created by platform admins, and limited byspec.allowedNamespaces. Resources reference one withconnectionRef: {kind, name}.- A namespaced connection that uses Kubernetes or JWT auth must name a
serviceAccountRefin its own namespace. The operator gets a short-lived token for that ServiceAccount through the TokenRequest API and logs in with it. It never logs in as its own ServiceAccount for a namespaced connection. - Credentials are read at login time, never at startup. One client per connection is cached, keyed by connection UID, generation and a hash of the credential inputs.
Consequences¶
- A tenant acts only with the OpenBao policy bound to its own ServiceAccount; the operator's identity cannot be borrowed.
- The operator needs
createonserviceaccounts/token. That permission must be documented and scoped in the chart. - The platform team configures one OpenBao role per tenant ServiceAccount.
- Cluster connections are a privileged path and must be guarded by RBAC and
allowedNamespaces.