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GitHub repository settings

The security workflows in .github/workflows only protect main if the repository settings below are in place. Apply them once when the repository is created, and again after a workflow job is added, renamed or removed (the required-check list must match the job names). The workflows themselves and their trust model are described in CI security.

hack/github/apply-settings.sh applies everything that has an API. Run it as a repository admin:

gh auth login --scopes repo,read:user
hack/github/apply-settings.sh alexandrust88/openbao-config-operator

It is idempotent: it updates the rulesets and environments it finds by name and creates the missing ones. The steps it cannot do are marked "manual" below.

Solo and strict mode

The project starts with one maintainer (GOVERNANCE.md). GitHub never lets the author of a pull request approve it, so a rule that requires an approval would block every change of a sole maintainer. The script therefore has two modes:

solo (SOLO_MAINTAINER=true, the default) strict (SOLO_MAINTAINER=false)
required approvals on main and release-X.Y 0 1
review from code owners off on
approval of the most recent push off on
release environment manual approval by the owner; the maintainer who started the run may approve it manual approval by the owner; prevent self-review on (see the residual risk)

Everything else is the same in both modes: pull requests, required status checks, code scanning, linear history, no force pushes or deletions, the tag ruleset, and the rest of this page.

Switch to strict mode in the pull request that adds the second maintainer to MAINTAINERS.md: add them as collaborators and code owners, merge, then run

SOLO_MAINTAINER=false hack/github/apply-settings.sh alexandrust88/openbao-config-operator

and update the decision rules in GOVERNANCE.md in the same pull request.

Prerequisites

  • A repository owned by a personal account, which has no teams. The owner is the code owner in .github/CODEOWNERS and the reviewer of the release environment (RELEASE_REVIEWER names another user). The bypass actor of the release-tags and release-branches rulesets is the admin repository role, which on a personal repository only the owner holds.
  • The Renovate GitHub App installed on the repository (manual, https://github.com/apps/renovate), with read access to Dependabot alerts so vulnerabilityAlerts in renovate.json works.
  • Optional, for release pull requests (manual, not configured yet): a GitHub App owned by the repository owner, with the repository permissions Contents and Pull requests set to read and write, installed on this repository. Store its client ID as the variable RELEASE_APP_CLIENT_ID and a private key as the secret RELEASE_APP_PRIVATE_KEY of the release-please environment. Without the app, release-please.yml logs "release-please skipped" and releases are tagged by hand (release process).

Dependency updates

renovate.json is the dependency-update configuration. Renovate groups Kubernetes libraries, OpenBao and Go toolchain updates, pins action/image digests, and proposes security fixes without automerge. Dependabot alerts supply vulnerability information; a second version-update bot is not required.

After installing the Renovate App, check that its Dependency Dashboard appears in repository issues and that an update PR includes the expected version and checksum changes. A configuration file alone does not prove the App has access. Review checksum pins and generated files in each update; run the normal PR checks before merging.

General

Settings > General.

Setting Value Why
Allow merge commits off
Allow squash merging on, default message "Pull request title and description" release-please builds the changelog from the squashed title and reads footers (BREAKING CHANGE:, Release-As:) from the body, which is the pull request description
Allow rebase merging off
Always suggest updating pull request branches on the main ruleset requires up-to-date branches
Allow auto-merge off Renovate does not automerge; every update gets a human review
Automatically delete head branches on
Discussions on categories Announcements, Q&A, Ideas, Show and tell (manual)
Wiki off the docs live in docs/
Releases: enable release immutability on a published release's assets and tag cannot change; gh release create in release.yml uploads every asset before it publishes

Rulesets

Settings > Rules > Rulesets. Rulesets, not classic branch protection: they cover tags too, and Scorecard reads them.

main (branch ruleset)

Target: the default branch and refs/heads/release-[0-9]* (the release-X.Y backport branches; the pattern leaves out the release-please--branches--* branches release-please creates and force-pushes). Enforcement: active. Bypass list: empty.

Rule Value
Restrict deletions on
Block force pushes on
Require linear history on
Require a pull request before merging solo mode: 0 approvals; strict mode: 1 approval, require review from code owners, require approval of the most recent push. Both: dismiss stale approvals on push, require conversation resolution, allowed merge method: squash
Require status checks to pass require branches to be up to date; the checks below, source "GitHub Actions"
Require code scanning results CodeQL: security alerts "High or higher", alerts "Errors"
Require signed commits optional (REQUIRE_SIGNED_COMMITS=true in the script). Squash merges made in the GitHub UI are signed by GitHub, so this only constrains direct pushes to release branches

Required status checks (the job names, or the job name: where one is set):

Workflow Check
ci.yml lint, test, integration, namespaces, livekit, verify-generated, api-coverage, govulncheck, manifests, docs-examples
e2e.yml e2e
conformance.yml conformance (runs on every pull request and measures only the kinds it touches, every kind of a group whose Go code changes, every kind when shared code changes, or reports "no kinds affected")
codeql.yml analyze (go), analyze (actions)
dependency-review.yml dependency-review
secret-scan.yml gitleaks
vulnerabilities.yml osv-scanner
workflows.yml actionlint, zizmor, pinact, poutine
pr-title.yml Conventional commit title
pages.yml pages (runs on every pull request and builds the site only when a docs path changed)

Not required, on purpose: labels and helm.yml (unittest, and lifecycle, which packages the chart and installs, upgrades from the last release, rolls back and uninstalls it on kind) run only when their paths change, and a required check that never starts blocks the merge. govulncheck-nightly does not run on pull requests.

release-branches (branch ruleset)

Target: refs/heads/release-[0-9]*. Enforcement: active. Bypass list: the admin repository role, on a personal repository only the owner (always).

Rule Value
Restrict creations on: only maintainers create a backport branch. A new release-X.Y branch can deploy to the release-please environment, which holds the GitHub App key, so a writer who could create one with an unreviewed workflow could read that key

release-tags (tag ruleset)

Target: refs/tags/v*. Enforcement: active. Bypass list: the admin repository role, on a personal repository only the owner (always).

Rule Value
Restrict creations on: only the bypass list can push a v* tag, and that push starts the release
Restrict updates on: a published tag never moves
Restrict deletions on

release-tags-signed (tag ruleset, optional)

Created only with REQUIRE_SIGNED_COMMITS=true (and deleted again without it). Target: refs/tags/v*. Enforcement: active. Bypass list: empty, because a bypass actor skips every rule of its ruleset, so a signature rule inside release-tags would never apply to the maintainers who push the tags.

Rule Value
Require signed commits on: the commit a v* tag points at must carry a signature GitHub verifies

The signature of the tag object itself (git tag -s in release-process.md) is not enforced: neither GitHub nor the release workflow checks it, so it is a convention, not a control.

Security

Settings > Advanced Security (called "Code security" on older plans).

Setting Value Why
Private vulnerability reporting on the intake channel in SECURITY.md
Dependency graph on needed by Dependabot alerts and dependency-review
Dependabot alerts on Renovate reads them (vulnerabilityAlerts)
Dependabot security updates on a fallback when Renovate is not running; Renovate usually opens the fix first
Dependabot version updates off (no .github/dependabot.yml) Renovate owns version updates; both would open duplicate pull requests
Secret scanning on
Push protection on blocks a push that contains a known secret format; secret-scan.yml covers the history
Code scanning default setup off codeql.yml is the advanced setup; default setup and a CodeQL workflow cannot both run

Code scanning receives SARIF from three workflows: CodeQL (codeql.yml), zizmor (workflows.yml) and Scorecard (scorecard.yml).

Actions

Settings > Actions > General.

Setting Value Why
Actions permissions allow the organization's and select non-organization actions
Allow actions created by GitHub on actions/*, github/codeql-action/*
Allow actions by verified creators off only the explicit list below
Allowed actions and reusable workflows see list every third-party action in the workflows, including nested ones
Require actions to be pinned to a full-length commit SHA on every uses: is SHA-pinned; Renovate keeps the pins current
Fork pull request workflows from outside collaborators require approval for all external contributors
Workflow permissions read repository contents and packages each job asks for what it needs; workflows start from permissions: {}
Allow GitHub Actions to create and approve pull requests off release-please uses a GitHub App token, see release-process.md
pull_request_target event policy leave it blocked (the public-repository default from 2026-12-02) no workflow uses pull_request_target; allowing it would only open a path for one added later
Require workflow lockfiles not available an Enterprise Cloud feature; the SHA pins plus the pinact check cover the same ground, see CI security

Allowed third-party actions (update when a workflow adds one):

crazy-max/ghaction-github-labeler@*
docker/build-push-action@*
docker/login-action@*
docker/setup-buildx-action@*
googleapis/release-please-action@*
ossf/scorecard-action@*
sigstore/cosign-installer@*

Environments

Settings > Environments.

Environment Deployment branches and tags Protection
release tags v* only required reviewers: the owner (RELEASE_REVIEWER); prevent self-review off in solo mode, on in strict mode (see solo and strict mode); holds the secrets HELM_SIGNING_KEY and HELM_SIGNING_PASSPHRASE, set by hand (chart signing key); cosign signing is keyless. Every publishing job of release.yml (image, chart, ocm, assets) uses it, so each waits for its own approval
release-please branches main and release-[0-9]* none; holds RELEASE_APP_CLIENT_ID (variable) and RELEASE_APP_PRIVATE_KEY (secret), set by hand; new release-* branches are restricted by the release-branches ruleset
github-pages branch main only (the script creates it if the first Pages deployment has not) none

Pages

Settings > Pages: source "GitHub Actions". The site is built and deployed by pages.yml.

Private repository

The workflows also run while the repository is private on a free plan. The features that need a public repository (or GitHub Advanced Security) are skipped, and they switch on by themselves once the repository is public:

Workflow Skipped while private Still runs
codeql.yml the CodeQL analysis and upload; analyze (go) and analyze (actions) pass without analysing
dependency-review.yml the whole job; the dependency-review check passes as skipped osv-scanner (vulnerabilities.yml) covers known vulnerabilities
workflows.yml the zizmor SARIF report and its upload the zizmor gate (--min-severity=medium), actionlint, pinact, poutine
scorecard.yml the Scorecard run, its publication and upload
pages.yml configure-pages, the Pages artifact and the deploy job the docs and Helm index build, so the pages check still fails on a broken site

codeql.yml and scorecard.yml read the visibility from the API because schedule events carry no repository object; the others use github.event.repository.private. gitleaks, osv-scanner, govulncheck and the tests do not depend on the visibility.

The repository settings have the same limit. On a private repository of the free plan, hack/github/apply-settings.sh prints one warning for each setting it skips and applies the rest: the general settings, Dependabot alerts and security updates, the Actions policy (allowed actions, SHA pinning, read-only default token, fork pull request approval), immutable releases and the three environments without protection. It reads the visibility and the plan from the API, and skips any other setting GitHub refuses with "Upgrade to GitHub Pro or make this repository public" the same way. Unenforced while private on the free plan:

Setting While it is missing
rulesets main, release-branches, release-tags (and release-tags-signed) no required pull request, status checks, code scanning results or linear history, and no force-push block, on main and release-X.Y; anyone with write access can create, move or delete a v* tag and start the release
release environment: required reviewer, deployment tags v* the publishing jobs start without an approval
release-please and github-pages environments: deployment branches any branch can deploy to them
secret scanning and push protection secret-scan.yml (gitleaks) is the only secret check
private vulnerability reporting the intake channel in SECURITY.md is closed
Pages source pages.yml builds the site and the Helm index but does not deploy them

When the repository becomes public (or moves to a paid plan):

  1. Run hack/github/apply-settings.sh again: it applies everything it skipped and the rest of this page. A setting it still warns about is not available on that plan.
  2. Make the ghcr.io packages public (Package settings > Change visibility), see release-process.md.
  3. Run scorecard.yml once (push to main or wait for the schedule) and check that the results appear in Security > Code scanning and on the OpenSSF Scorecard API.
  4. Register the project for the OpenSSF Best Practices badge (https://www.bestpractices.dev).

Check the result

gh api repos/alexandrust88/openbao-config-operator/rulesets --jq '.[] | [.name, .target, .enforcement] | @tsv'
gh api repos/alexandrust88/openbao-config-operator/actions/permissions
gh api repos/alexandrust88/openbao-config-operator --jq .security_and_analysis
gh api repos/alexandrust88/openbao-config-operator/immutable-releases

The Scorecard run on main (Security > Code scanning, tool "Scorecard") then reports Branch-Protection, Token-Permissions, Pinned-Dependencies and SAST from these settings.